Is more computation the answer?
An honest reading of the evidence on deeper search, more samples, bigger models, and large training runs — what has been measured, what has not, and under which conditions compute converts into strength.
It is the most natural question in the project: the best policy averages about a third of the target, computers are fast, so search deeper, sample more, train bigger. This page goes through what the repository has actually measured for each of those, in plain language, with the technical record one click away. The short version: it depends entirely on what the compute is spent on. Spent on removing a measured bias in how the search handles luck, it was worth about a third more score and it unlocked a whole extra ply of look-ahead. Spent on more imagined futures for a planner with a broken objective, it made things measurably worse. Spent on bigger models trained on the wrong shape of data, it reproduces the same blind spot with more confidence. The most promising untested use — closing a learning loop that has already been half built here — is section 4.
1. Deeper search
Going from depth 3 to depth 4 helped clearly: on the same eight games, fair D4 outscored fair D3 by a wide margin and won seven of them. That is the evidence that looking ahead matters.
Going from depth 4 to depth 5 has not produced a better policy so far. The status summary records that selective depth 5, full depth 5, and variants that stop at the next row rise "often spent much more work, sampled chance outcomes too noisily, or overrode good D4 actions on unstable estimates."
But a later, replicated measurement reframes that whole conclusion, and it is the most important thing on this page. Depth was never being tested on its own. Every historical depth experiment sat on top of a chance estimator that was quietly biased — see section 2 — and when that bias was removed, the fourth ply went from worth almost nothing to worth a great deal:
- with the old five-sample estimator, depth 4 beat depth 3 by about 7,700 points, which the confidence interval could not distinguish from zero;
- with an exact seven-sample estimator, depth 4 beat depth 3 by about 86,000 points, and the interval cleared zero comfortably.
In the finding's own words: "With a biased chance estimator, the fourth ply buys nothing. With an exact one, it is worth 86,000 points." Depth and the quality of the chance estimate are complements, not independent dials. That is a mechanism for the repository's most-repeated conclusion — "deeper is not automatically stronger" — and it means the depth-5 question has never actually been asked cleanly.
It is now affordable to ask. The fast engine brought a depth-5, seven-sample 64-game cohort down to roughly 19 CPU-hours, under an hour on this workstation, against an earlier projection of 75 hours. That does not predict the answer; it means the experiment can be run and recorded rather than argued about.
The technical record
- Fair D4 vs D3: 400,675 vs 235,071 mean score over the same 8 corrected-score games (status, evidence snapshot).
- The depth × estimator interaction, from finding-05 (evidence tier development, replicated across two independent cohorts, 64 paired games): depth 4 minus depth 3 is +7,723 points with five strata (95% lower bound −42,743 — not significant) and +86,172 with seven (lower bound +26,468, 40–0–24 wins–ties–losses).
- Depth-5 variants: status §3.
- Depth-5 / seven-strata cost: measured work 55,765,609 per decision against a worst case of 582,727,796; 19.1 CPU-hours per 64-game cohort with the fast engine; thread scaling was not measured (fast engine, §6 of finding-13).
2. More samples of the future
This is where the answer splits in two, depending on what the extra samples are being spent on.
When more samples fixed a real bias — and paid
The reference search does not enumerate every possible next disc. It draws a fixed number of representative samples at each chance node: five, in the frozen reference. But the next disc is uniform over seven values, and five samples cannot represent seven possibilities. An audit measured the consequence: on average 2.41 of the 7 disc values receive zero weight at every chance node, and because the sampling is deterministic the error never averages out. The search was not mis-estimating the future randomly; it was systematically blind to part of it.
Raising the sample count to seven makes the next-disc expectation exact. On 64 previously unread paired games that was worth +101,171 mean points (+34%) and +27.5 more moves per game, winning 41 games, tying none and losing 23, with a 95% lower bound of +47,457. The result was replicated on a second independent cohort.
That is the clearest "more compute helped" result in the repository — and note what it actually bought: not more search, but an unbiased one. The extra samples removed a defect rather than adding depth.
When more samples made things worse
One family of planners handles uncertainty by imagining many complete futures ("worlds"), planning in each as if the hidden values were known, and choosing the move that does best on average. It is embarrassingly parallel: more worlds, more compute, done.
The repository measured what happens as the number of worlds grows from 1 to 1,024. Quality rose steadily up to 256 worlds — and then fell. At 1,024 worlds the planner survived about half as long and scored about half as much on the same games as it did at 256.
That is not a bug; it is a known property of this kind of planner. Inside each imagined world the plan is made with the answer key — it knows how the hidden discs will turn out — so it systematically overvalues moves that only pay off if the covers happen to be right. With few worlds, sampling noise accidentally protects the planner from its own bias. With many worlds the noise vanishes and the planner converges, faithfully, on the wrong answer. More compute bought a more faithful optimisation of the wrong objective. The finding's own conclusion: improving this planner requires changing the estimator, not spending more on it.
The technical record
Seven strata versus five, from finding-05 (development tier, replicated; the zero-weight measurement is audit-02 H1): at depth 4, +101,171 points / +27.50 moves, 95% lower bound +47,457, 41–0–23. At depth 3 the same change is +7,276 points with a lower bound of −45,961 — not significant. The effect is an interaction with depth, not a main effect of sampling.
Clairvoyant (hindsight-optimisation) planner, horizon 7, pooled numbered clears per move on the original eight tapes, from finding-12 §3:
| worlds K | 1 | 4 | 16 | 64 | 256 | 1,024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| clears / move | 1.5370 | 1.7095 | 1.9279 | 2.1403 | 2.2309 | 2.0947 (6 tapes) |
Paired on the same six tapes, K = 1,024 vs K = 256: mean moves 100.33 vs 182.00; mean score 347,348 vs 653,644; five of six tapes worse. The arm was stopped at 6 of 8 games. Note that this planner is an oracle — it reads hidden values — so its scores are not policy evidence; the lesson is about the estimator, and it "bounds the whole determinization family."
3. Bigger models and more training
Many learned evaluators were trained here: n-tuple networks, Monte Carlo value models, small neural networks, Q-learning and policy-gradient variants, phase models, fitted policies. Some predicted outcomes well. None displaced fair D4.
For most of them the diagnosed reason was not model size and not training length. It was the shape of the data: models were trained on the move that was played and then asked to rank moves that were never played — the sibling trap. A bigger model trained on the same data learns the same blind spot with more confidence. The status summary is explicit that students "usually lacked enough diverse successor data, failed held-out sibling ranking, or were too slow to improve complete games."
So the first honest answer to "would a giant training run fix it?" is: not if it trains on the same kind of data. A thousand GPUs generating played-move-only labels produce the failure at scale.
The most recent line is the exception that sharpens the point. The afterstate pilot did fix the data shape — and then ran into two different walls, label noise and undertraining, both of which are things compute buys down. Section 4 is about that.
4. Where compute would convert into strength
There is a way of spending compute that addresses the diagnosed problem directly:
- At every position the actors visit, run a fair search for every legal column, under the same random futures, and record all seven values — the successor-closed data the sibling page calls for.
- Train a public evaluator on those labels.
- Put the trained evaluator at the leaves of the search and repeat. Each round's labels come from a stronger searcher than the last.
Steps 1 and 2 have been done here, at pilot scale, and they are the reason this section is not speculation. The afterstate pilot built exactly that corpus — every legal sibling, chance scenarios shared across siblings — and trained an evaluator on it. What it found is the most useful compute result in the repository: with eight imagined futures per label the labels were too noisy to learn a reliable ranking from, and raising that to 256 — a 32× increase in compute per label — fixed the stability problem outright. The bottleneck then moved to the model itself, whose own result record names an undertrained checkpoint (11 of 20 planned epochs) and a weak teacher.
That is a compute-response signal in the direction the theory predicts, and it is also a warning: it is one pilot at one scale, and the model it produced still lost to fair D4 on ranking, and its most conservative deployment narrowly failed its gate.
Step 3 — closing the loop — has not been done. No trained evaluator here has been put back at the leaves of the search to generate the next round of labels. That is the step that makes compute compound rather than saturate: it is approximate policy iteration, the pattern behind the strongest game-playing systems of the last decade, adapted to a one-player game with a hard information boundary.
Steps 1–3 together are now a registered theory with stated ways to prove it wrong. The next concept page, what a large-scale run would look like, describes the software shape, the order of work, and the gates it would have to pass — starting with a small pilot on a single workstation.
5. The hardware that exists today
For completeness: this workstation is a 16-core / 32-thread CPU with an integrated GPU that shares system memory. The GPU has been made to work for training and, for the small network sizes tried, runs 1.25–5× faster than the CPU depending on batch size — measured on a busy machine, so as lower bounds. Exact game simulation and tree search remain CPU work; the hardware plan places a full GPU simulator as a research prototype that would have to prove itself move-for-move identical first. Everything in section 4 can be piloted here before it is scaled anywhere.
The technical record
gpu-01 (ROCm enablement, correctness, throughput, two wheel defects and workarounds); amd-ryzen-halo (workload placement and memory policy); fast engine (CPU simulation cost and the batching primer).